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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P laintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
BILLY FRANK SPILLERS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: CaseNo.20040346-CA 
Appellant Billy Spillers ("Spillers") maintains he was entitled to have the jury 
instructed at trial on the lesser-included offense of extreme-emotional-distress man-
slaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter. (See Brief of Appellant, dated 
August 5, 2004 ("Brief of Appellant"), Argument, Point I.) In response, the state does not 
dispute the law applicable to the lesser-offense instructions here. (See State's Brief of 
Appellee ("State's Brief), 16-17 (acknowledging that manslaughter is a lesser-included 
offense of murder; also, those forms of manslaughter "require proof of all the elements of 
murder," plus an additional element: "extreme emotional distress" or "a reasonable belief 
that the conduct was justified when it was not)); see also State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 
124, Tft[6, 8-14, 63 P.3d 94 (recognizing the relationship between manslaughter and 
murder; also, the jury may find every element for murder and still consider manslaughter 
under the extreme-emotional-distress and imperfect-legal-justification variations). 
Instead, the state claims that Spillers was not entitled to have the jury instructed on 
manslaughter because the evidence "provided no rational basis for a jury to convict him 
of extreme emotional distress manslaughter or imperfect legal justification 
manslaughter." (State's Brief, 18; see also id. at 29, n.12 (recognizing that in Shumway, 
the state made the same argument: it claimed "there was no evidence to support a finding 
of extreme emotional distress manslaughter or imperfect self-defense manslaughter")); 
but see Shumwav. 2002 UT 124 at ffl[12-14 (ruling that while the state has identified one 
interpretation for murder, there are other interpretations that support manslaughter; the 
conflicting interpretations "underline the importance of a correct jury instruction on 
[defendant's] theory of imperfect legal justification manslaughter"). 
According to the state, the evidence required the jury to believe either that Spillers 
was guilty for a verdict of murder "in cold blood," or not guilty for a perfect self defense. 
(See State's Brief, 20-30, 31.) The state's view of the evidence is too narrow. Also, it is 
irrelevant to the analysis here. Under the proper standard, a defendant is entitled to a 
proper lesser-offense instruction if "some evidence" exists to support the lesser offense. 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988). "[Jjuries should not be precluded 
from determining how criminal conduct should be characterized and judged. In all 
events, a defendant has an absolute right to have the jury instructed on a lesser crime, as 
long as there is some evidence to support it." Id. 
In this case, the jury deliberated for more than 7 hours, late into the evening. (R. 
235:177 (jury began deliberations at 4:22); 235:183 (jury reached a verdict at 11:55 
p.m.).) The jury had questions about the testimony of a state witness, and the gun that 
Jackson used to hit Spillers. (R. 235:179-81.) The length of deliberations suggests the 
jury had concerns about various interpretations of the evidence. Yet it was permitted only 
to consider two interpretations: whether Spillers was fully justified for self-defense, or 
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not justified for murder. (See R. 119-147.) Those choices were inadequate. 
The trial court precluded the jury from considering whether Spillers reasonably 
believed he could defend himself but was not justified in using deadly force. (Id.) The 
court also precluded the jury from considering whether the stressful circumstances of a 
violent attack influenced Spillers5 actions. (Id) The trial court's ruling was in error. 
(Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.) 
The trial court failed to give the jury the full spectrum of lawful alternatives for 
resolving the factual issues. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-203(3); 76-5-205(1 )(b) (1999). 
Indeed, the trial court forced the jury to elect between guilty of a first-degree-felony 
offense or acquittal. "This is exactly the sort of forced choice that lesser included 
offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly the choice that the jury would not 
have had to make if [defendant's lesser-offense] instruction had been given." State v. 
Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 428 (Utah 1986). The trial court's failure to instruct on the lesser 
offense of extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification 
manslaughter was improper, and it violated Spillers' right to a fair trial. He respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
POINT I. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THE LEGAL POINTS 
RAISED IN SPILLERS' OPENING BRIEF. THE LAW AND THE FACTS 
SUPPORT REVERSIBLE ERROR HERE. 
The standard for instructing the jury on a lesser-included offense is met here. (See 
e.g. State's Brief, 16, 17): Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424 (citing State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 
159 (Utah 1983)); Shumwav. 2002 UT 124 at H1J9-14. The state acknowledges that 
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extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter 
are lesser-included offenses of murder. (State's Brief, 16.) Also, those forms of man-
slaughter are consistent with an intentional killing; they require "proof of all the elements 
of murder, plus finding that the defendant acted under extreme emotional distress[,] or a 
reasonable belief that his conduct was justified (id) when, "in fact," it was not. (Id, 19.)1 
The state acknowledges that to assess whether a defendant is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on a lesser-included offense, the court must "view the evidence and the 
inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the defense." (State's 
Brief, 17 (cite omitted).) Yet, according to the state, Spillers was not entitled to a 
manslaughter instruction here because "the evidence presented at trial provided no 
1 As set forth in the opening brief, Baker identifies a two-part test for lesser offense 
instructions. The trial court must provide a lesser-offense instruction if (1) the statutory 
elements of the greater and lesser offenses overlap and (2) the evidence provides a 
"rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convic-
ting him of the included offense." Baker. 671 P.2d at 159; (Brief of Appellant, 13-14.) 
The second part of the Baker test is not fully relevant in the context of the man-
slaughter alternatives at issue here. Specifically, the court is not required to consider 
whether the evidence provides a basis for acquitting the defendant of the greater offense 
before convicting him of manslaughter. (See Brief of Appellant, 13-14.) Indeed, extreme-
emotional-distress manslaughter and imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter are 
consistent with an intentional killing. Thus, the jury "could have found that every 
necessary element for murder had been satisfied and yet that manslaughter was the crime 
committed" under those variations. Shumwav, 2002 UT 124 at ffl[6, 14 (emphasis added). 
Those forms of manslaughter also are characterized as affirmative defenses: they 
reduce a conviction from murder to manslaughter. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a) 
(1999). For an affirmative defense, the court is not required to find a rational basis in the 
evidence "for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged." Baker. 671 P.2d 
at 159. Rather, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense if there 
is some basis in the evidence for the instruction, "whether the evidence is produced by 
the prosecution or by the defendant." See State v. Knoll. 712 P.2d 211, 214 (Utah 1985). 
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rational basis for a jury to convict him of extreme emotional distress manslaughter or 
imperfect legal justification manslaughter." (State's Brief, 18.) The state's assertion relies 
in part on a misapprehension of the law for those variations of manslaughter, and in part 
on conflicting assertions and a restrictive view of the evidence. (State's Brief, Point I.) 
As further set forth below, the state's interpretation of the evidence is 
inconsequential to the analysis here. (See infra. Point LA. & I.B., herein.) The evidence 
in this case viewed in the light most favorable to the defense supports that Spillers was 
entitled to have the jury consider the manslaughter alternatives as a basis for the 
conviction. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 (where defendant requests an instruction for a lesser 
or related offense and there is some rational basis in the evidence for the instruction, "the 
instruction must be given"); (Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point LB.; infra. Point LA. 
and LB., herein.) The trial court erred in its ruling. 
A. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE MANSLAUGHTER ALTERNATIVES. 
1. Extreme-Emotional-Distress Manslaughter. 
The law provides that in a case for murder, a defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter if evidence supports that defen-
dant was '"exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress5 such that [c]the 
average reasonable person under that stress would have an extreme emotional reaction to 
it, as a result of which he would experience a loss of self-control and that person's reason 
would be overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive 
agitation, or other similar emotions.^]" Shumway, 2002 UT 124 at f9 (citing State v. 
5 
Bishop. 753P.2d439, 471 (Utah 1988), overruled on other grounds by State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)). Spillers has shown that he was entitled to have the jury 
instructed on that form of manslaughter. (Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.B.(l).) 
The state disagrees. It claims that for extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter 
under the law, "the defendant's reaction to the event must be reasonable." (State's Brief, 
26.) Also, the state asserts that based on the facts, Spillers was not entitled to a man-
slaughter instruction because he did not testify that he "actually was suffering from ex-
treme emotional distress when he shot" Jackson, and he acted in full control, purposefully 
and with discretion in the matter. (Id at 27- 29.) Spillers addresses each claim in turn. 
First, with regard to the state's claim that "defendant's reaction" "must be 
reasonable," the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that instructions for extreme-emotional-
distress manslaughter "should not be read as requiring the jury to find that defendant's 
acts of killing were reasonable'' Bishop, 753 P.2d at 472 (emphasis added); see also id. at 
471; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(i), (3)(c) (1999). Rather, that form of man-
slaughter applies when a person is exposed to unusual and overwhelming stress and he 
reacts under the stress by causing the "death of another." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
203(3)(a), 76-5-205(l)(b); Bishop. 753 P.2d at 471. The reaction is criminal.2 
Also, according to the plain language of the statute, the reasonableness language 
2 If the "reasonableness" language at § 76-5-203(3)(a)(i) required the jury to consider 
whether the defendant reacted reasonably (see State's Brief, 26), or used a reasonable 
amount of force against another, that interpretation would erode the difference between a 
perfect self-defense (§ 76-2-402) and criminal manslaughter (§ 76-5-203(3)(a)). 
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does not relate to the reaction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(i). The statute requires 
that the jury consider whether there is a reasonable explanation for the defendant's 
distress. Id; see also Shumwav. 2002 UT 124 at ^|9; Bishop. 753 P.2d at 471, 472; (Brief 
of Appellant, Argument, Point I.B.(l)). That form of manslaughter considers whether the 
defendant was somehow provoked by the stressful circumstances to react, albeit 
unlawfully. See Bishop. 753 P.2d at 471, 472. 
The record here supports the instruction for extreme-emotional-distress man-
slaughter. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.B.(l).) According to the facts, 
Jackson initiated a violent attack against Spillers by hitting him on the back of the head 
with a gun. (R. 235:49-50.) Spillers was dazed and scared. (R. 235:59-60; 233:204.) He 
turned, grabbed Jackson's arm and they tussled. (R. 235:50, 63, 66-69.) Spillers urged 
Jackson to back up and he pushed Jackson away. (Id.) Jackson then cocked his arm and 
came forward to strike Spillers again. (Id; 234:35-37.) Spillers fired his weapon. (R. 
235:50,69.) He recalled shooting only once. (R. 235:69.) The evidence showed Jackson 
was shot three times. (R. 234:11.) Spillers had a hematoma on the back of his head con-
sistent with being hit with a blunt object. (R. 234:157-58, 179-81.) The medical examiner 
testified the evidence would support that Jackson prepared to strike again in a confined 
space when Spillers fired the gun. (R. 234:35-37, 39, 41, 235, 238; see also 234:49-50.) 
The shooting occurred while Spillers continued to be "' exposed to extremely 
unusual and overwhelming stress.'1' See Shumwav, 2002 UT 124 at T|9. Jackson's initial 
attack and continued aggression "could be found by a jury to provide a reasonable excuse 
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or explanation for [defendant's] stress and rage that resulted in [the fatal wound to the 
victim]" for extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter. Id. at ffljl 1, 13; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(i); State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978) (recognizing 
that intentional killing constitutes manslaughter if the victim's actions induced anger in 
the defendant); People v. Harris, 134 NJ3.2d 315, 317 (111. 1956). 
Next, the state asserts those facts are insufficient for the instruction. It claims that 
Spillers was required to testify that he "actually was suffering from extreme emotional 
distress when he shot Bo." (State's Brief, 27-28 (stating that Spillers5 testimony that he 
was nervous, and saw stars, felt cloudy, and was uncomfortable and scared after Jackson 
struck him, "is not indicative of'extremely unusual and overwhelming stress'").) 
In support of that claim, the state cites to Shumway, 2002 UT 124, and State v. 
Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983). (State's Brief, 28.) 
In Shumway, the defendant did not testify. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124 at ^ 10 
(relying on defendant's statements to police). In addition, there is no indication that 
Shumway described his emotions. Id. Notwithstanding, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that one interpretation of the evidence supported "the necessity for a manslaughter 
instruction" under the extreme-emotional-distress alternative. Id. 
Under this interpretation of the evidence, Brookes [Shumway] arguably did not 
bring about the disturbance by his own conduct, but rather Christopher initiated a 
violent and traumatic act by attacking Brookes with the knife. Christopher's 
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aggressive conduct could be found by a jury to provide a reasonable excuse or 
explanation for Brookes' stress and rage that resulted in Brookes stabbing 
Christopher in the throat and chest. 
Shumway, 2002 UT 124 at f 11. The result in Shumway is consistent with the law. See 
Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267 (stating the "defendant has an absolute right to have the jury 
instructed on a lesser crime, as long as there is some evidence to support it"). Shumway 
is analogous to Spillers' case, where Spillers was exposed to stressful circumstances that 
he did not bring about. Indeed, Jackson initiated a violent attack, which would provide a 
reasonable explanation for Spillers' stress that resulted in the shooting. (See e.g. R. 571, 
13.) 
In Clayton. 658 P.2d 624, defendant was charged with attempted murder. 
According to the evidence, the defendant and victim "began to spar in fun" at a friend's 
apartment when the defendant pulled a knife and then twice grabbed a coke bottle to 
threaten the victim. Id at 625. The victim pushed defendant into a window, but "never 
threatened [him] with any type of weapon." Id Friends intervened in the fight. After 
defendant left the apartment, the victim and the others went to a bar. Defendant arrived at 
the bar 20 minutes later, "carrying his gun at his side." Id The victim "had nothing in his 
hand; he made no sudden moves toward the defendant nor did he reach for his pocket. 
Witnesses testified that [the victim] actually moved away from defendant. Defendant 
raised his pistol, shot [the victim] in the abdomen, and fled the pool hall." Id 
Based on the facts, the Utah Supreme Court ruled the defendant was not entitled to 
instructions on attempted voluntary manslaughter and the record failed to support "a 
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moral or legal justification" for defendant's conduct. Id at 626. However, defendant 
was able to present his theory of the case to the jury in other ways: the trial court 
instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault, and threatening 
with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel. Id at 627. Where voluntary man-
slaughter is concerned, Clayton is factually distinguishable from this case: the evidence in 
Clayton did not support that the victim initiated a violent attack against defendant. 
(Compare e.g. R. 571, [^3 (trial court found that Jackson initiated the violent attack).) 
Under the rationale of Shumwav and Clayton. Spillers was entitled to an instruc-
tion for manslaughter as a lesser offense, where the evidence supported the instruction. 
(See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.) 
Finally, the state claims the evidence supports that Spillers was in full control, and 
he acted "purposefully and with discretion when he shot Bo [Jackson]." (State's Brief, 
28-29 (citing R. 235:50, 63)3.) 
Under the law, n[t]he extreme emotional disturbance form of manslaughter is 
consistent with an intentional killing." State v. Piansiaksone. 954 P.2d 861, 870 (Utah 
1998). It is consistent with purposeful conduct. (See also State's Brief, 16 (recognizing 
3 The portions of the record cited by the state support that after Jackson struck Spillers, 
Spillers turned to face him. (R. 253:50.) Jackson then raised his arm back and Spillers 
"felt like [Jackson] was going to cock me again." (Id.) Spillers urged Jackson twice to 
back up. Instead, Jackson came forward. Spillers fired his weapon only after Jackson 
continued toward him. (Id.) On cross-examination, Spillers reiterated that sequence of 
events: he fired only while he continued to be exposed to the extremely stressful and 
unusual circumstances. (R. 253:63.) 
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that the elements of murder are consistent with the forms of manslaughter at issue).) 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that it is theoretically possible for the jury to 
find that every necessary element for intentional murder M[has] been satisfied and yet that 
manslaughter [is] the crime committed if the jury [finds] that the killing was committed 
'under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse.5" Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 870. Thus, in this case, even if the 
evidence supports purposeful conduct, Spillers was entitled to have the jury instructed on 
extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter. See also supra, note 1, herein. 
Under the proper standard, Spillers had an absolute right to have the jury instructed 
on manslaughter where "some evidence" existed to support extreme emotional distress. 
See Standiford. 769 P.2d at 267; Shumwav. 2002 UT 124 at ffl[9-13; (Brief of Appellant, 
Argument, Point I.B.(l).) The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on that lesser 
offense. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124 at [^14 (ruling that conflicting interpretations of 
evidence "underline the importance of a correct jury instruction on [defendant's] theory" 
for manslaughter). Spillers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction 
and order a new trial so that he may present proper manslaughter instructions to the jury. 
2. Imperfect-Legal-Justification Manslaughter. 
According to the law, the jury may consider the imperfect-legal-justification form 
of manslaughter if evidence supports that defendant reasonably believed he could defend 
himself, but defendant was not justified under the law in using deadly force. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii) (1999); (State's Brief, .19 (stating that imperfect-legal 
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justification exists if the defendant was wrong in his belief that deadly force was justified: 
"The law provides leniency, however, for those who err in deciding whether the use of 
deadly force is legally justified")); see also State v. Turner, 79 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1938) 
(defendant was the aggressor and the only party to arm himself with a knife and a gun; he 
was convicted of manslaughter); State v. HowelL 649 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 1982) (defendant 
and a third person were engaged in an altercation at a party; defendant left to retrieve a 
gun; when he returned, he engaged in a scuffle with the victim, killing him and wounding 
another; defendant was convicted of manslaughter and attempted manslaughter); State v. 
Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, TJ10, 36 P.3d 533; (Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point 
LB.(2)). 
In this case, the trial court was persuaded that an interpretation of the evidence 
supported that Spillers believed he was entitled to defend himself. The trial judge 
allowed instructions on perfect self defense. (R. 130-32, 128.) Spillers maintains that 
the evidence also supported an instruction on an imperfect-self defense. See HowelL 649 
P.2d at 95 (in a murder trial, the jury was instructed on perfect self defense and voluntary 
manslaughter for an imperfect self defense; "[t]he same basic facts were equally at issue" 
for both theories); 2 W. LaFave & A.Scott, Substantive Crim. Law § 7.10 at 253 (1986) 
(intent to kill is an element of voluntary manslaughter); State v. Howard, 597 P.2d 878, 
879-81 (Utah 1979) (defendant was charged with two murder counts; the court 
considered the evidence to be consistent with defendant's claims of self-defense and an 
imperfect-legal justification). 
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The state disagrees. It claims that the evidence here was susceptible of only two 
interpretations: self-defense where Spillers was about to suffer serious bodily injury or 
death when Jackson struck him, or intentional murder where Jackson did not strike 
Spillers. (See State's Brief, 18-25 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (allowing the use 
of deadly force to prevent death or serious bodily injury or to prevent the commission of 
a forcible felony that creates the risk of death or serious bodily injury).) Yet, the jury here 
could find that the evidence supported other interpretations: that Spillers was entitled to 
defend himself against an attack but was not entitled to use deadly force. That would 
support an imperfect-legal justification. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii). 
According to the evidence, Jackson did not use a gun to shoot Spillers, but used it 
in another way: he hit Spillers on the head with the butt of the gun. (R. 235:49-50, 63; 
571-572, *p.) Under those circumstances, the jury could find that there was a legitimate 
issue as to whether or not Spillers was entitled to use deadly force to defend himself. 
Specifically, the jury could find that Jackson's conduct did not cause serious 
bodily injury to Spillers, and that any risk of death was remote. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-601(10) (defining serious bodily injury). The jury could find that Spillers was not 
entitled to fatally shoot Jackson where Jackson did not threaten to shoot Spillers, but 
merely struck him with the weapon. (See R. 235:63.) The jury could find that Spillers 
was entitled to defend himself, but "err[ed]" (State's Brief, 19) in the use of deadly force. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii) (1999); see also Knoll, 712 P.2d at 216 (finding 
that the nature of the wound to the victim, who initiated the attack, could evidence that 
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defendant's acts in defending himself went beyond what was reasonably necessary). In 
that instance, the facts would support an intentional killing consistent with imperfect-
legal-justification manslaughter. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(3)(a)(ii); Howell 649 P.2d 
at 94. Indeed, the jury deliberated late into the night for 7 hours (see. R. 235:177-83), 
apparently struggling with the only choices provided for a verdict: murder or perfect self 
defense. (See R. 146.) The choices were inadequate under the law. 
Where the evidence supports that defendant believed he was entitled to defend 
himself, the jury should have been allowed to consider whether Spillers was correct in 
that belief (for perfect self defense) or whether he "err[ed]" in that belief (for imperfect 
self defense). Spillers was entitled to have the jury instructed on the full range of appro-
priate choices. See Shumwav. 2002 UT 124 at ffi[13-14; Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424, 428. 
Spillers requested that the jury be instructed on that form of manslaughter as a 
basis for the conviction (R. 445-48; 235:87-89; see. also Brief of Appellant, Argument, 
at Point I.C.(l).) The trial court refused the request. (R. 235:87-95.) That was error. 
Where the defendant requests an instruction of a lesser included or a related 
offense and where there is some rational basis in the evidence on which the jury 
could find as the defendant requests, the instruction must be given. State v. Crick, 
675 P.2d 527, 538 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting). The rule of [State v. 
Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983),] is not a mere technical rule designed to trip up 
judges and prosecutors. It serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to 
find a defendant guilty of any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to 
elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal. 
Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. Here, the jury "was never given the choice," id. at 428, of 
considering the imperfect-legal-justification form of manslaughter. (See R. 119-147.) 
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The jury was forced to choose between murder or acquittal. "This is exactly the sort of 
forced choice that lesser included offense instructions are designed to avoid, and exactly 
the choice that the jury would not have had to make if [defendant's lesser-offense] 
instruction had been given." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 428. 
As the court in Hansen recognized, "[s]ociety has a legitimate interest in the jury's 
freedom to act according to the evidence." Id. at 424 (cites omitted). Spillers respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case and order a new trial where 
Spillers will be entitled to present the lesser-included offense instructions to the jury as a 
basis for the conviction. 
B. THE ERROR PREJUDICED SPILLERS; THIS COURT IS NOT BARRED 
PROCEDURALLY FROM REACHING THE MERITS AND REVERSING THE 
CASE FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The state claims that any error in failing to instruct the jury on manslaughter as a 
basis for the conviction was harmless. In support of that assertion, the state focuses again 
on a narrow interpretation of the facts: it claims the evidence supports "that defendant 
murdered his victim in cold blood." (State's Brief, 30-31.) The state's assertion 
disregards the law as it relates to lesser-included offenses. In considering whether the 
jury should have been instructed on a lesser offense, this Court will not engage in a 
sufficiency analysis to determine if the evidence supported the verdict. See e.g. State v. 
Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1989) (the prejudice analysis is not an analysis 
for the sufficiency of the evidence). Likewise, it will not "weigh the credibility of the 
evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. Rather, this 
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Court will decide whether there is "some evidence" (Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267) to 
justify an instruction on the lesser offense, "a decision which must be made concerning all 
jury instructions in any trial." Baker, 671 P.2d at 159. 
In Baker, the Utah Supreme Court specified that if the evidence is such that alter-
native inferences may legitimately be made to support the lesser offense, the trial court 
should instruct the jury on the lesser offense. See kL That preserves the function of the 
jury as the finder of fact; it allows the jury to weigh and interpret the evidence. See Id. 
Any other approach to the matter would deprive the defendant of the right to have 
the jury interpret and decide the facts. See State v. Law, 147 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1944) 
(whether defendant was justified in his conduct, whether he had reasonable ground to 
believe that adversary was about to take his life or to do him great bodily harm, whether 
he felt the need to resort to deadly force, whether he used unnecessary force on his ad-
versary, whether he or the adversary brought on the encounter are questions for the jury); 
Turner, 79 P.2d at 52 (whether the adversary provoked defendant or was sufficiently 
menacing to cause defendant to believe deadly force was necessary was a jury question); 
Knoll, 712 P.2d at 215-16 (the jury "had to determine whether the defendant's killing of 
[the victim] was reasonable and necessary"). 
In short, this Court must remand the matter for a new trial if any interpretation of 
the evidence would support a proper manslaughter instruction. See Piansiaksone, 954 
P.2d at 871 (court considers "indirect evidence in the record" in the light "most favor-
able" to a determination as to whether defendant acted under "extreme emotional dis-
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turbance"); (see also Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point LB.). 
"The requirement is more than a procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's 
constitutional right to a jury trial." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. "[J]uries should not be 
precluded from determining how criminal conduct should be characterized and judged. 
In all events, a defendant has an absolute right to have the jury instructed on a lesser 
crime, as long as there is some evidence to support it." Id. at 267. 
Finally, this Court is not barred procedurally in considering the merits of the man-
slaughter issue on appeal. The state does not dispute that the manslaughter instructions 
were in Spillers' best interests at trial, and in this case the defense timely requested the 
instructions. (See State's Brief; Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point I.C.) This Court 
may decide the merits of the issue here and reverse and remand the case for a new trial. 
POINT II. THE STATE ARGUES FOR NARROW APPLICATION OF 
RULE 404(b). CASE LAW ALLOWS 404(b) EVIDENCE WHEN IT IS 
PRESENTED FOR A NONCHARACTER PURPOSE AND WHEN IT IS 
RELEVANT AND NOT UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL. 
At trial, Spillers sought to present evidence of Jackson's drug and criminal history. 
(R. 234:223-30.) The evidence would support Jackson's frame of mind on October 25, 
1999, where he argued with his brother, Keith Harris, over drug and money matters, and 
he remained in a frantic, paranoid state when he initiated an attack against Spillers. (Id.: 
R. 234:146-48; 235:21, 31-32, 41-47.) Spillers intended to present the evidence to give 
credibility and context to his defense that he shot Jackson only after Jackson snapped 
from the pressures he was under, and attacked Spillers with a gun. (R. 234:223-30.) The 
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evidence was admissible at trial under Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (2000). Spillers maintains 
the trial court erred in failing to admit the 404(b) facts into evidence. The trial court's 
error warrants reversal in this case. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument, Point II.) 
In the event this Court reverses Spillers' case for a new trial as requested in Point 
I, supra, Spillers will be restored to his pre-trial status. See Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2004); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 28(a) & 24(d) (2004). At a new trial, Spillers may renew his request 
under proper circumstances to present evidence of Jackson's prior bad acts under Rule 
404(b). If Spillers determines to raise that issue at a new trial, the trial court may decide 
then whether the evidence is admissible. 
Thus, while this Court may order reversal for the error in Point II (see. Brief of 
Appellant, Argument, Point II.), it also may choose to deal briefly with the evidentiary 
issue here, to give guidance to the trial court in connection with the new trial ordered at 
Point L, supra. See State v. Belh 770 P.2d 100, 107-08, 110-11 (Utah 1988) (where the 
appellate court has ordered retrial, it may then address remaining issues, including a 
404(b) issue, briefly for the guidance of the trial court, where the issues may recur on 
retrial); State v. Cloud. 722 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986). 
As guidance, Utah courts have ruled that when a trial court considers the 
admission of evidence under Rule 404(b), the court must examine the evidence to 
determine if (1) it "is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those 
listed in rule 404(b); (2) the evidence meets the requirements of rule 402; and (3) the 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^jl6, 2005 
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Utah LEXIS 22 (citing State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2000 UT 59, ffl[ 18-20, 6 P.3d 1120; 
State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57, TI21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837); (Brief of Appellant, 44). The 
trial court here should be guided on retrial by those factors. It should be encouraged to 
conduct "a complete and thorough application of the three-step procedure as set forth by 
the Utah Supreme Court and as followed here" when considering the admissibility of 
evidence under Rule 404(b). State v. Holbert. 2002 UT App 426,1J38 n.6, 61 P.3d 291. 
Spillers maintains that proper application of the three-part test will support admis-
sibility of Jackson's criminal charges as set forth in the Brief of Appellant and as follows. 
Under the first factor, Spillers sought to present the evidence for a proper, non-
character purpose: to show Jackson's state of mind when he hit Spillers on the head with 
the butt of the gun. (See Brief of Appellant, 47.) The evidence was not admitted to 
show that Jackson had a propensity to commit crime. (Brief of Appellant, 47-48.) The 
evidence would show only that Jackson attacked Spillers because he was stressed, frantic 
and angry about his circumstances surrounding drug deals and law enforcement investi-
gations. The evidence was necessary to prove motive and intent. That purpose satisfies 
the first factor. See Men, 2005 UT 11 at ffl| 17, 20-21. 
Under the second factor, Spillers demonstrated relevance: The specific 404(b) 
evidence of the raid on Jackson's home, the charges Jackson faced, and the drug deals 
would give further credence to the fact that Jackson was paranoid and stressed due to his 
drug and legal problems, and in his stressful, frantic state, he attacked Spillers. (See Brief 
of Appellant, 47); Allen. 2005 UT 11 at 1f23; also State v. Bisner. 2001 UT 99, ^ 58, 37 
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P.3d 1073; State v. Pearson. 943 P2.d 1347, 1351 (Utah 1997) (in an aggravated murder 
case, where defendant shot an officer during a chase, evidence that defendant sold a 
marijuana cigarette in Indiana was relevant to state of mind and motive: 'The more 
reasons [defendant] had to kill the officer and thus evade capture and future dealings with 
law enforcement, the more plausible was the State's theory that he did so intentionally 
rather than recklessly"): U.S. v. James. 169 F.3d 1210, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1999). 
The evidence went to state of mind, and would make the facts surrounding 
Jackson's attack more probable. Utah R. Evid. 402 (2004). It would corroborate that 
Jackson was under investigations for drugs and it would give credence to the stresses on 
Jackson when he accused Spillers of cooperating with drug agents and then attacked 
Spillers. (See R. 235:31-32, 42, 45-46, 47-50); see also Allen. 2005 UT 11 at ^23 
(404(b) evidence would corroborate the proponent's allegations of the facts). 
Finally, under the third factor, the evidence was admissible. The third factor con-
siders Rule 403 and whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial. The court in Allen re-
cognized that the evidence of defendant's uncharged criminal conduct was presented 
'"only for the limited purpose of determining if it tend[ed] to show: proof of motive, op-
portunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake.' Additionally, the 
introduction of the evidence did not cause unnecessary delay, since the State introduced 
the majority of its evidence relating to Allen's fraudulent credit card applications and 
purchases through stipulated exhibits, and all other references made of Allen's fraudulent 
activities were relatively brief." Allen, 2005 UT 11 at ^|27; (Brief of Appellant, 48-49). 
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Also, the court assessed the matter under the "Shickles" factors: 
In considering whether to exclude otherwise admissible evidence under rule 403, 
we have stated that a district court should evaluate several factors, including 
["]the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the 
crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. ["] 
Allen, 2005 UT 11 at T[24 (citing Decorso. 1999 UT 57 at ^  29; State v. Shickles. 760 
P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988)). 
The state asserts that Spillers has not properly considered the Rule 403 analysis. 
(State's Brief, 39.) According to the state, Rule 403 requires the court to "consider how 
the victim's or the State's interests may be compromised." (State's Brief, 39.) Yet such a 
consideration is improper; if courts precluded evidence because it compromised an op-
ponent's case, that would be fundamentally unfair. Our adversarial process allows the 
defendant to present evidence putting the state's case in doubt, so long as the evidence is 
relevant. The state's argument here is not supported by the law. 
In this case on retrial, the trial court should be guided by the Shickles factors in 
determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403 via Rule 404(b). See Holbert 
2002 UT App 426 at ^ [38 n.6. Those factors may be satisfied on retrial as follows. 
First, the strength of the evidence regarding Jackson's bad acts was sufficient. 
According to defendant's proffer, Jackson faced charges for possession of a dangerous 
weapon and paraphernalia, among others. (R. 234:228-29.) The prosecutor acknowledged 
Jackson's felony charge, and the prosecutor represented to the court that the lowest 
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charged offense against Jackson was for firearms possession. (See idL; State's Brief, 33). 
The prosecutor relied on Jackson's rap sheet as he described the charges against Jackson 
to the court. (See R. 234: 228-29.) The judge accepted the proffer and ruled on the 
evidentiary issue. (See R. 234:229-30); see also Holbert 2002 UT App 426 at ^|39. 
The proffer of charged wrongs was proper and undisputed. See Allen, 2005 UT 11 
at 1H[26, 34 (finding that evidence of an "uncharged wrong" may be admissible at trial); 
State v. Telford. 940 P.2d 522, 526 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (stating "we will not set aside a 
verdict because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence 
appears [in the] record") (cite omitted); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 
578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978) (ruling that proponent's failure to proffer evidence 
precluded him from asserting that excluding the evidence constituted error). 
On appeal, the state argues for the first time that the strength of the proffer for the 
charged offenses is questionable. (State's Brief, 40.) The prosecutor made no such 
challenge below likely because he had possession of the rap sheet. (See R. 234:228-29); 
see also Utah R. Prof. Cond. 3.8 (2004), Comment ("A prosecutor has the responsibility 
of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate"); State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 
712, 714, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (counsel offered proffer in open court, claiming 
witnesses would have provided testimony to refute state's claims; the trial court 
"accepted]" the proffer and ruled). The proffer should not preclude the admissibility of 
otherwise proper evidence under Rules 404(b) and 403. 
Second, the similarities between the charges at issue and the concerns Jackson 
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expressed to Spillers in his frantic state are similar. At the time of the shooting incident, 
Jackson expressed paranoia and frustration with respect to drug investigations and money 
problems. (State's Brief, 34.) Evidence of Jackson's criminal charges for drugs and fire-
arms makes Spillers5 testimony - that Jackson was in a frantic state of mind and paranoid 
about drug /law enforcement investigations - more plausible. The evidence was not 
being offered to support that Jackson and Spillers were involved in a drug deal, but to 
support Jackson's state of mind due to legal and financial pressures. (R. 234:223-29.) 
Third, the state acknowledged that charges against Jackson remained pending and 
unresolved as of the day of the incident here. (State's Brief, 33; R. 234:228-29.) The evi-
dence supports that Jackson continued to be stressed about the criminal investigations at 
the time of the shooting. That supports the admissibility of the evidence under the rules. 
Fourth, the need for the 404(b) evidence was very high in this case, and the 
efficacy of alternative proof was very low. In closing argument, the prosecutor urged the 
jury to find Spillers' account implausible and inexplicable. (R. 235:167.) He suggested 
that Spillers acted without reason. (Id.) Thus, the evidence of pending charges was 
necessary to prove that Jackson initiated the attack: he faced real pressures, and snapped 
under those pressures when he attacked, causing Spillers to react. Evidence of the 
charges would add a level of credibility that a jury could not easily dismiss as fabricated. 
The evidence was necessary to support Spillers' account of the events of October 25, 
1999. It would make Spillers' testimony more plausible. (Brief of Appellant, 47-48.) 
Fifth, the evidence would not rouse the jury to "overmastering hostility" toward 
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Jackson. See Allen. 2005 UT 11 atffi[24, 33; (State's Brief, 42). The "overmastering" 
factor may apply more appropriately in circumstances where the government has charged 
a defendant, and then has attempted at trial to present evidence of other bad acts to cause 
the jury to be overcome with hostility toward the defendant. The danger of overmastering 
is not a concern here. (State's Brief, 42 (evidence "would not have roused the jury to 
overmastering hostility").) The 404(b) evidence of pending charges would not cause the 
jury to be hostile toward Jackson; it is not the kind of evidence that would inflame the 
jury against a victim. The evidence would simply explain Jackson's violent conduct on 
the night of the shooting. It would serve the truth-seeking function. 
A prosecutor is "the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of 
a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). In 
this case, the requested 404(b) evidence would ensure that the jury had all information 
relevant to the truth. The evidence would have ensured justice. 
Spillers respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this matter 
for a new trial, where the trial court will "conduct a complete and thorough application of 
the three-step procedure as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court" for admissibility of evi-
dence relating to Jackson's criminal history. See Holbert 2002 UT App 426 at ^ [38 n.6. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Brief of Appellant, Spillers respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial. 
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